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Abstract
Much of Africa has been ravaged by the AIDS epidemic. There, heterosexual contact
is the primary mode of transmission for the HIV virus. Even when access to condoms
is good and their price low, a large fraction of young Africans continue to engage in
unprotected sex. In this paper, we propose a simple two period rational model of sexual
behavior that has the potential to explain why a large proportion of sexual activity
in poor countries maybe unprotected. In the model economy, even when agents are
perfectly cognizant of the risk involved in unsafe sexual activity, and fully internalize
the eﬀects of their own sexual behavior on their chance of catching the virus, they may
rationally choose to engage in such risky behavior. Our results indicate that safe sexual
practice is essentially a “normal good” and that development may be key to reducing
HIV infectivity.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In much of Africa and in many other parts of the world, the presence of HIV/AIDS has
created an intimate tangle of sex and death. The numbers are staggering and mind-numbing
at the same time. Upwards of 25 million people worldwide have died from AIDS; another
40 million live with the disease today. Of all regions in the world, sub-Saharan Africa is
the hardest hit; while only 10% of the world’s population lives there, the region contains
around 70% of people living with the disease. With a HIV prevalence rate of 12-25%, and
an average duration from HIV infection to death of about 9 years, the lifetime chances of
dying from AIDS is around 40 percent in Eastern and Southern Africa as a whole and 70
percent in Zimbabwe and Botswana. What remains mind-boggling is why, faced with these
statistics, so many people “insist on playing the Russian-roulette game of unprotected sex”.
(Joseph, 2005)
Perhaps the most immediate barrier to safer sex is inaccurate risk perception. In a
recent survey (cited in Joseph, 2005) conducted in South Africa by Nelson Mandela, 63
percent of HIV-positive South Africans (who didn’t know their status) said it was close to
impossible that they were infected. 1This suggests that South Africans assess themselves
as being at substantially lower risk than dispassionate evidence would suggest. A similar
pattern of self-delusion exists everywhere.2 On the face of it, this would suggest that a
large part of the solution to the AIDS crisis would involve mass education, information, and
awareness programs. Not surprisingly, that is exactly where the AIDS-ﬁghting community
has spent most of its scarce resources. These programs, however, have not resulted in
sustained behavior change, and have largely failed to prevent the general spread of the
disease in developing countries.3 As Caldwell (2000) puts it bluntly, “the epidemic cannot
1Caldwell (2000) reports that “It almost takes an act of faith to relate the appearance of AIDS symptoms
to sexual encounters that occurred almost a decade ago, given that at least 95 percent of seropositive Africans
do not know of their infection until the symptomatic AIDS stage.”.
2In practically all countries surveyed in a 2002 UN report “HIV/AIDS: Awareness and Behavior”,
including those where HIV prevalence is high, at least two thirds of female respondents and 8 of 10 male
respondents said that they are either at no risk at all or at small risk of getting AIDS.
3In the UN report “HIV/AIDS: Awareness and Behavior” (2002), only a small percentage of respondents
began using condoms to prevent HIV transmission. Fewer than 8 per cent of women in all countries surveyed
report that they have changed their behaviour by using condoms.
2be defeated by more education.”
This paper argues for consideration of a wider context of sexual behavior. Following
Caldwell (2000), it formalizes the notion that even when individuals are acutely aware of
the risk of contracting HIV, a sense of disillusionment with their own future can easily help
rationalize high-risk and unsafe sexual practices. Speciﬁcally, if their future is uncertain to
even exist (presumably because of general high mortality) or appears unattractive because
of current stagnation and poverty, individuals may take on a “distinctly careless attitude
to life” and cease to fear death as much.4
The formalization of this argument is conducted in a model environment whose details
are as follows. Consider an economy in which individuals live potentially for two full
periods. When young, they work for a ﬁxed wage, engage in safe and unsafe sex, and save
for the future in a ﬁxed return asset. We postulate that both safe and unsafe sex provide
utility to the young although unprotected sex raises the probability of contracting the HIV
virus and hence hastens death. We also assume that the total volume of sexual activity
across countries is ﬁxed at unity. The principal novelty here is that agents are fully aware
of the link between their own sexual activity and their probability of catching the HIV
virus.
The baseline model is deliberately kept simple so as to generate analytical tractability.
We are able to show that there exists a unique fraction of coital activity that is protected.
This fraction is greater than one-half, because agents internalize the eﬀect of their decision
to have unsafe sex on their probability of reaching the future. We also prove that this
fraction increases with development. The implication is clear. As countries become richer,
their citizenry will increase the fraction of all sexual activity that is protected. In the model
economy, this translates into a lower lifetime probability of contracting the virus. When
utility conditional on being infected goes up (presumably because of better treatments and
so on), then we ﬁnd that unsafe sexual activity increases. The basic intuition underlying
these results is simple. When the future looks attractive (and in the model, it does so
4As Caldwell (2000) reports, “some men practicing high-risk sex say that, if the latency period until
onset of AIDS is nearly a decade, they are not worried because they are likely to die of something else in
such a long time.”
3when a country develops), people try to make sure that they will be around to enjoy it;
they achieve that by reducing the fraction of all sexual activity that is unsafe.
T h ep r e d i c t i o n so ft h eb a s e l i n em o d e la r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t hs i m p l ec o r r e l a t i o n so b s e r v e d
in the data. For example, data from a long list of countries suggest that condom use
is positively associated with development; indeed condom use among young people who
engage in high risk sex is also positively correlated with development. HIV infections rates,
similarly, are negatively correlated with the level of development of a country.5
We go onto the extend the baseline model in two ways. First, we incorporate the eﬀect
of general public health and public health systems into the probability of contracting AIDS.
Now, an agent’s probability of catching AIDS depends on his own sexual activity as well as
on the general public health facilities he is surrounded by. Here we ﬁnd that interestingly,
the relationship between protected sexual activity and development is no longer monotonic
as before. Curiously enough, unsafe sexual activity may in fact increase slightly after a
critical level of development has been reached. This appears to be consistent with recent
evidence on the resurgence of unsafe sexual practices in the Western world. In the model
economy, this happens because agents substitute out of protected sexual activity once they
realize that their governments are spending more on public health and this reduces their
risk of contracting the disease.
The paper goes on to investigate the possibility of multiple equilibria. It shows that
under an extension of the baseline model, there can be two equilibria, one in which most sex
is protected, and the other in which it is not. Countries may ﬁnd themselves in one of these;
indeed, countries at very similar levels of development may diﬀer vastly in the popularity
of protected sexual activity (and hence HIV infectivity). This is quite consistent with cross
section data. After all, HIV prevalence rates and condom use in many poor countries, even
poor countries within Africa, are not close to being similar.
The upshot is that even when agents are perfectly cognizant of the risk involved in
unsafe sexual activity, and fully internalize the eﬀects of their own sexual behavior on their
chance of catching the dreaded disease, they may rationally choose to engage in such risky
5Bloom et. al. (2001) ﬁnd evidence of a positive correlation between countries’ HIV prevalence and
poverty, as measured by per capita income, income inequality, or absolute poverty.
4behavior. The novelty here is that agents, by their choice of sexual activity, inﬂuence the
discount factor between the current and the future. Our results indicate that safe sexual
practice is essentially a “normal good” and that development with a promise of a better
future may be key to reducing HIV infectivity. What is also interesting is that once public
health improves substantially and quality of life under AIDS ceases to be dismal, unsafe
sex may become popular again.
The paper closest in spirit to the current endeavor is Oster (2007). 6 Like us, she models
the sexual behavior response of rational individuals who face the prospect of contracting
HIV. Our work diﬀers from hers in two important respects. First, we allow agents to
internalize the eﬀects of their own behavioral response (via a choice of safe versus risky sex)
on their risk of getting infected; in her setup, agents choose the number of partners to have
sex with and treat other things as being parametric. Perhaps more importantly, she does
not focus on the decision to engage in protected versus unprotected sex. Notwithstanding
these diﬀerences, she ﬁnds that the sexual behavioral response is sharper for the rich and
for those with high non-HIV life expectancy, a result analogous to our ﬁnding that those
for whom the future is worth waiting for will reduce their demand for unsafe sex more than
those with dim futures. Overall, she ﬁnd strong empirical support with African data for
her aforementioned hypotheses.
Our paper is also in line with a new and evolving literature that incorporates mortality
concerns in growth models. The seminal papers in this literature are Blackburn and Cipri-
ani (2002) and Chakraborty (2004). Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) endogenize old-age
mortality concerns in a growth model. They assume that in a three-period overlapping
generations model, the probability with which an agent survives to the third period de-
pends on the stock of human capital or more generally, on the level of development of the
economy itself. Chakraborty (2004) introduces endogenous mortality in an otherwise stan-
dard overlapping generations model with production; in particular, the probability with
which a young agent survives on to old age depends on public health expenditures which
are in turn funded by income taxes on labor income. In more recent work, Chakraborty
6Almost all the work in the current paper was done before the authors became aware of Oster (2007).
5and Das (2005) and Chakraborty et. al (2007) allow for the possibility that private invest-
ments may be made to alter one’s probability of death. Our focus is quite diﬀerent from all
these papers but we do share a thematic continuity with them insofar as they investigate
endogenous mortality concerns.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the baseline
model and prove existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium while in Section 3 we derive
our main analytical results connecting the demand for unsafe sex and its relationship with
development. In Section 4, we explore two alternative reformulations of the baseline model
and study the possibility of multiple equilibria while Section 5 concludes.
2 The baseline model
2.1 Preliminaries
We study a simple economy in which a unit-mass continuum of agents live for a maximum
of two periods. In the ﬁrst period of life, when agents are young, they work in a competitive
labor market and earn a wage w; they are retired in the second period of life, i.e., when they
are old. When young, agents engage in protected (p) and unprotected (u) sex, consume,
and save for old age at the gross world interest rate of R. When old, they consume the
return from their previous savings, and die towards the end of the period.
We impose the condition
p + u =1 . (1)
The reason for this condition is that almost nothing is known about the total volume of
sexual activity across countries. There is some information on the relative frequency of
safe and unsafe sex. To prevent our results from getting tainted by the largely unknown
t o t a lv o l u m eo fs e x u a la c t i v i t y ,w eﬁxed that number to 1 across all countries.7
7The 2007 Durex Global Sexual Wellbeing Survey questioned more than 26,000 people in 26 countries
about all aspects of their sex lives and found that the global average is 103 times a year: South Africans
(120), Americans (114), Greeks (164 times), Brazilians (145); Poles and Russians (143) have the most sex
and the Japanese the least (48 times). 75% of all countries surveyed have sex around a 100 times a year.
6Any agent may survive onto old age disease-free with probability 1 − θ. We think of θ
as the lifetime cumulative probability of contracting the HIV virus or, more simply, getting
AIDS.8’9 In the baseline model, we assume
θ(u)=uλ; λ>1 (2)
where u is the fraction of all sexual encounters that is unprotected (i.e., sex without a
condom) an agent has had when young and λ is a parameter. It is easily veriﬁed that
θ is convex in u implying that the higher the amount of unprotected sex an agent has,
the higher the probability with which he contracts AIDS and the latter increases at an
increasing rate. 10


















Here co denotes old age consumption, p denotes the quantity of protected sex, u, the
quantity of unsafe or unprotected sex (or sex without the use of a condom as a barrier
against infection), and γ is a parameter.11 Also, δ is a parameter capturing the fraction of
old-age utility one gets after having contracted the virus during one’s youth. It may also
be interpreted as the fraction of old-age one gets to enjoy after getting infected. As an
indirect measure of δ, it has been noted that life expectancy in Zimbabwe and Botswana
would be 25 years higher than what it would be had AIDS not aﬀected these countries!
There are several additional things to note here. First, notice that θ depends on u
but not p; this is in line with epidemiological evidence [see Davis and Weller (1999)] that
8Sexual transmission is responsible for an estimated 80 percent of the world’s H.I.V. infections. The
estimated risk of H.I.V. transmission during a single act of vaginal sex is on the order of 1 in 1,000 if the
woman is the infected party, and somewhat higher for an infected man. Anal sex has a higher associated
risk, and oral sex a lower one.
9The risk of HIV transmission via heterosexual intercourse is highest early in the course of HIV infection,
before most infected people know their HIV status, according to the latest research. This line of research,
following a cohort of over 15,000 adults living in rural villages in Rakai, Uganda, suggests that the rate of
heterosexual HIV transmission per coital act varies over the course of HIV infection. Among partners with
newly acquired HIV infection, more than 40 percent transmitted to their partners within approximately 5
months. (see Wawer, et. al. 2005).
10The connection between θ and u is strong. The mode of transmission, for example, for nearly 90% of
AIDS cases between 1996-99 in Africa was unprotected heterosexual contact.
11Choosing the same exponent for p, u, and c
o is not necessary for any of the results we report below.
7ﬁnds “condom’s eﬃcacy at reducing heterosexual transmission may be comparable to or
slightly lower than its eﬀectiveness at preventing pregnancy”, roughly 90%. Second, in
the way we have deﬁned these preferences, people are assumed to have an independent
demand for both types of sex. This seems natural. After all, there may be many reasons
(pregnancy prevention, disease prevention, etc.) that may create a demand for protected
sex; similarly, as has been documented by epidemiologists, reduced sexual pleasure or
hindrance to spontaneity and so on, are well known reasons why many people who often
have protected sex may occasionally have unprotected sex. The percentage of people (both
men and women) aged 15—24 reporting the use of a condom during sexual intercourse with
a non-regular partner in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2001—2005 is the range of 25-45%. 12
Since agents care only about old-age consumption, and hence save everything they earn,
the budget constraints facing an agent in this baseline model are simply
w = S (4)
and
co = RS (5)
where S is saving. 13
When (1) holds, the utility from sexual activity rises with protected sex until p =0 .5
and then falls.
12Gender power inequities are believed to play a key role in the HIV epidemic through their eﬀects
on women’s power in sexual relationships. For example, among sexually experienced, 15- to 24-year-old
women in South Africa, women with “low relationship control” were 2.10 times more likely to use condoms
inconsistently and inconsistent condom use was, in turn, signiﬁcantly associated with HIV infection. See
Pettifor et.al (2004) for details.
13We have not added a cost to protected sex to keep things simple here; there is evidence to suggest that
cost of condoms to adolescents may be quite high especially in developing countries. We revisit this issue
in Section 4.







Figure 1: Utility from sexual activity as a function of p
Below, we will show that the rational agent will choose p>0.5 because he will internalize
the eﬀect of his decision to have unsafe sex on his likelihood of catching the disease.
2.2 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
The problem of a young agent is to ﬁgure out the optimal fraction of coital acts that should














Note that we can use (2) to write
[1 − (1 − δ)θ(1 − p)] = 1 − (1 − δ)(1− p)
λ .
Then, the ﬁrst order conditions to the agent’s problem (interior solution) is given by
p−γ − (1 − p)−γ +
h












Then, simplifying (7) further, we get
(1 − p)
γ − pγ = −ν (1 − p)
λ+γ−1 pγ. (8)
9Deﬁne
G(p) ≡ (1 − p)γ − pγ,
and
K (p;w) ≡− ν (1 − p)
λ+γ−1 pγ.
Then eq. (8) may be compactly expressed as
G(p)=K (p;w) (9)
For future reference, note that at a valid maximal solution p∗, the following second order
condition must hold:
G0 (p∗) − K0 (p∗;w) < 0. (10)
It will be useful to accumulate some pertinent information about the functions G and
K. First, it is easy to show that G0(p) < 0.Next, it straightforwardly follows that
G(p)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1 if p =0
> 0 if p ∈ (0,0.5)
0 if p =0 .5
< 0 if p ∈ (0.5,1)
−1 if p =1
holds. Therefore, if there exists a solution p∗ to (9), it must be the case that p∗ > 0.5 since
K(p) < 0 for all p ∈ [0,1].
It is also easy to verify that K(0) = 0 and K (1) = −∞.A l s o ,







Notice that K0 (p)=0when p = ˘ p ≡
γ
λ+2γ−1. If the turning point for K (p), i.e., ˘ p, occurs
to the left of 1/2, then it follows that to the right of p =1 /2,Gis strictly falling and K
is strictly increasing, implying a single intersection. It is easy to check that ˘ p<1/2 holds
for λ>1. We are then ready to state our primary existence and uniqueness result.
10Proposition 1 Eq. (9) has a unique solution, p∗.
For future reference, an equilibrium is deﬁned as a p∗ which satisﬁes (10). Presumably
p∗ is heavily inﬂuenced by w, our proxy for the level of development. We will investigate
this link below. In passing, also note that since agents do not care about young-age
consumption, their savings are not inﬂuenced by their choice of p.
3P r o t e c t e d s e x
3.1 Protected sex and development
An important motivation of this paper has been to investigate the impact of development
on the private allocation of sex to its safe and unsafe forms. In other words, how does w
aﬀect the choice of protected sex? Below, we show that the eﬀect of w on p is monotonic.
Proposition 2 p∗ increases with w, i.e., the fraction of all coital activity that is protected
increases with development.
Proof. From (9), it follows that
G(p∗) ≡ K (p∗,w).






G0 (p∗) − K0 (p∗)















< 0 and hence
∂p∗
∂w > 0 holds.
The implication of Proposition 2 is that as poorer nations experience development,
citizens in those countries will conduct an increasing fraction of their sexual activity in safe
forms.
11The intuition is simple. With development, wages rise and agents desiring to smooth
consumption wish to spread some of that increase in wages to the future. The future then
becomes more attractive to wait for. In the model, this attractiveness of the future gets
translated into a substitution of sexual activity from unsafe to safe forms.
Is there any evidence we can bring to bear to support the empirical predictions of our
simple model? First, our model hypothesizes that richer countries should have lower HIV
infection rates, since θ falls with w. The following ﬁgure seems to suggest that at a broad
level of aggregation, the model’s prediction is roughly in line with reality. The poorer
nations, on average, seem to have larger fractions of their population living with HIV.
9
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Figure 2: HIV incidence and development
Second, our model predicts that condom use (or rather fraction of all sexual activity that
is protected) should rise with income.
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Figure 3a: Condom use across countries
This picture illustrates condom use across a cross section of about 150 countries.14 A
quadratic trend line has been added in for visual convenience. The data is for couples
who use condoms for contraceptive purposes. Since using condoms is the only way to have
protected sex, we believe it is fair to use this “condom use” data as a rough proxy for p
even though the twin goals of contraception and protection from STDs are presumably not
shared by all couples. As is clear from the picture, the association between the increase in
condom use with development is fairly pronounced in poorer countries.15
14The condom use data is the percentage of couples where the woman is of reproductive age
(15-49 years) using condoms for contraceptive purposes. Data are for the most recent year avail-
able. Source: World Contraceptive Use 2004, database maintained by the United Nations, De-
partment of Economic and Social Aﬀairs, Population Division. Data may be accessed from:
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/POP_HIVAIDS2005/POP_HIVAIDS.htm. GDP per
capita numbers are for 2006.
15A case in point is Uganda. There “between 1988 and 1995, the percent of married Ugandan women
who were currently using condoms rose from 0 percent to 0.8 percent and from 0 percent to 15.4 percent
for sexually active unmarried women. This trend continued between 1995 and 2000: the percent of married
Ugandan women who were using condoms rose from 0.8 percent to 1.9 percent and for sexually active
unmarried women it rose from 15.4 percent to 29 percent. Between 1995 and 2000 condom use among
married men rose slightly from three percent to ﬁve percent. However, among unmarried men aged 15—24,
reported condom use at last sex increased sharply –from 39 percent to 57 percent. Thus marital use of
condoms increased only slightly while non-marital increases were dramatic. However, a large proportion of
13There is scattered data (mainly from African nations) in the World Health Statistics
(2006) on condom use at higher risk sex in young people aged 15-24 years both for males
and females. When plotted against GDP per capita, as Figure 3b suggests, the correlation


















































































Figure 3b: Condom use at higher risk sex in young people aged 15-24 years (males)
againsy GDP per capita
3.2 Protected sex and loss of utility from contracting AIDS
It is well known that the health-related quality of life in patients with HIV disease may be
particularly important because of the disease’s chronic debilitating course and the uncertain
eﬀects of current treatments on morbidity: new antiretroviral treatments improve survival,
but the durability of the therapeutic eﬀect is uncertain and severe side eﬀects are common.
There is strong evidence to suggest that physical functioning and emotional well-being
among patients with symptomatic HIV disease, or who had AIDS, were worse than for
sexually active unmarried youth, particularly young women, do not use condoms at all”. HIV prevalence
has reduced from a median of 19.8 per cent in 1995 to 5.5 per cent in 2001 among women attending
antenatal care at sentinel sites but the rate of decline is lower in the 1996-2001 period (1.25 per cent per
year) compared to 1992-95 (2.43 per cent per year). See Murphy et.al (2006) for details.
14patients with several other chronic diseases. In addition, lingering fatigue, depression
(often arising from loss of employment), and so on plague patients for many years. In sum,
AIDS contributes to a sharply reduced quality of life.
In our setup, we can investigate the eﬀects of this reduced quality of life by adjusting
the parameter δ. Lower δ implies a reduced quality of life conditional on contracting the
disease.
Proposition 3 Ceteris paribus, a rise in δ reduces p∗, i.e., when quality of life subsequent
to being infected rises, the equilibrium response is to engage in more unsafe sex.
Proof. From (9), it follows that
G(p∗) ≡ K (p∗,δ).






G0 (p∗) − K0 (p∗)
Since (10) holds at p∗, the denominator is negative. It is easy to check that ∂K




The implication is interesting. The model predicts that as quality of life while infected
improves (presumably with improved access to better antiretroviral treatments with fewer
side-eﬀects), the fraction of sexual encounters that are protected, goes down!
This appears to be consistent with epidemiological evidence suggesting that initiation of
HAART (highly active antiretroviral treatment) regimens may be related to continuation
of or increases in sexual risk behaviors. Using a sample of 724 American women who
initiated HAART between January 1996 and January 2001, Wilson et. al (2004) ﬁnd
that “the risk for unprotected sex was higher after HAART initiation than before HAART
initiation among all sexually active women”. More importantly, Proposition 3 is in line with
Lakdawala, Sood, and Goldman (2006) who ﬁnd that in the US “advances in treatment
have improved the health of the infected, reinvigorated their sexual activity, and thus
rekindled the spread of HIV” and that “increases in HIV infection rates might themselves
have resulted from improvements in HIV treatment and the accompanying declines in the
deadliness of HIV.”
154 Alternative formulations
The baseline model was kept deliberately simple to facilitate derivation of clean analytical
results. In this section, we attempt, often via numerical examples, to showcase several
alternative model formulations. Importantly, the possibility of multiple equilibria may
arise.
4.1 Role of public health
While unsafe sex is a primary factor in the transmission of HIV, it must be noted that








; λ>1,φ∈ [0,1] (11)
where h is a measure of the general health of the population, and λ and φ are parameters.
In postulating the connection between θ and h, we have the following in mind. First,
we believe that if there are very few infected individuals in a society, the probability of
catching the HIV virus from an unprotected sexual encounter has to be low. Even if the
number of infected individuals is high but everyone is made aware of their infection status
via costly public health programs, then again the risk of contracting the virus from an
act of unsafe sex is low. Second, it is clear that in poorer countries, the level of public
health and public health services is low and the general population is generally susceptible
to many other competing diseases whose presence may increase HIV infectivity. 16For
example, Corbett, et.al (2002) ﬁnd that “the high prevalence of untreated STD infections
has been a major factor facilitating the spread of HIV-1 in Africa; with the synergistic
interaction between HIV-1 transmission and genital herpes being of especial concern for
c o n t r o lo fb o t hd i s e a s e s . ”
16In this sense, h captures the idea that non-HIV life expectancy (used in Oster, 2007) is high in countries
with superior public health systems.
16Below, we are going to assume, following Chakraborty (2004) and others, that
h = τw
where τ is the tax rate on wage income. The idea, of course, is that countries that spend a
lot on maintaining a high level of public health tend to have generally healthy populations.17
It is easily veriﬁed that
θ(ut,h t) ∈ (0,1) : θ1 (ut,h t) > 0; θ2 (ut,h t) < 0 (12)
holds. The implication is that ceteris paribus, the higher the amount of unprotected sex an
agent has, the higher the probability with which he contracts AIDS; similarly, the higher
the general health of the population, given a level of unsafe sex, the lower is the probability
of catching the disease.







Figure 4: θ against u (φ =0 .2,h=1 ;λ =1 .2 in black, and λ =1 .6 in red)
17The WHO (2000) report presents the same idea as follows: “If Sweden enjoys better health than Uganda
– life expectancy is almost exactly twice as long – it is in large part because it spends exactly 35 times
as much per capita in its health systems”.
17The dependence of θ on λ deserves mention. As is clear from Figure 4, an increase in
λ has an important eﬀect on the probability of catching AIDS. Notice that the marginal
impact on the AIDS probability of an additional unit of unprotected sex is much higher at
low levels of unprotected sex when λ is low. There is evidence to suggest that about half of
all new infections happen in people in the 15-24 age group. The WHO report “Protecting
Youth from HIV” argues that the risk of contracting the virus is greater if “someone starts
sex at a young age and has multiple partners. Many young people have sex before marriage
with more than one partner. The ﬁrst sexual experience for many girls is forced or coerced.
Many boys have their ﬁrst sexual experience with a sex worker. Girls who have sex with
older men are vulnerable: immature bodies are more susceptible to HIV.”18
In the model economy, the budget constraint (4) is replaced by w(1 − τ)=S. Then,
routine algebra veriﬁes that (7) is now replaced by
p−γ − (1 − p)−γ +
"
φλh(1 − δ)(1− p)
λ−1



















Proposition 4 Eq. (13) has a unique solution, p∗.
Proof. Deﬁne
ˆ G(p) ≡ p−γ − (1 − p)−γ.
18Morison (2001) ﬁnd that “the chance that a person becomes infected with HIV during one particular
sexual contact varies greatly and depends on many factors. Male to female penile-vaginal transmission
appears to be 2—3 times more eﬃcient than female to male transmission and there is some evidence that
ﬁrst sexual intercourse for females may be associated with particularly high transmission probabilities.”
18It is easy to show that ˆ G0(p) < 0. Next, it follows that
ˆ G(p)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
∞ if p =0
> 0 if p ∈ (0,0.5)
0 if p =0 .5
< 0 if p ∈ (0.5,1)
−∞ if p =1
holds. It is also easy to verify that ˆ K(0) = − ˆ ν
(h+1)2 < 0 and ˆ K(1) = 0 since θ11 > 0
(because λ>1 holds; see below). Also,
ˆ K0(p)=ˆ ν(1 − p)λ−2(λ − 1)h − (λ +1 ) ( 1− p)λ
(h +( 1− p)λ)3 > 0
because
θ11 = φλh
(λ − 1)h − (λ + 1)(1 − p)λ
(h +( 1− p)λ)3 > 0.
Since ˆ G(p) is monotonically decreasing and ˆ K(p) is monotonically increasing, ˆ K(0) < ˆ G(0)
and ˆ K(1) > ˆ G(1), there must exist one and only one solution, p∗.
We are now in a position to show that unsafe sex may respond non-monotonically to
development even when public health directly aﬀects the probability of catching AIDS.
Proposition 5 Suppose p∗ exists for all w. Then, at suﬃciently low (high) levels of w, p∗
rises (falls) with w.
Proof. From (13), it follows that
G(p∗) ≡ ˆ K (p∗,w).






G0 (p∗) − ˆ K0 (p∗)
Since (10) holds at p∗, the denominator is negative. Noting that ˆ K may be rewritten as
ˆ K ≡−
λτ(1 − δ)(R(1 − τ))
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(2 − γ)(1− p∗)
λ − wτγ




Note that (1 − p∗) ∈ (0,1/2] for all w ≥ 0.
First, we can show that as w → 0, p∗ → 1/2 and
∂p∗
∂w → 0. However, as w increases by
as u ﬃciently small amount,
∂p∗





τγ 2−λ.A n di tr e m a i n ss oa sw rises. Finally,
∂p∗
∂w → 0 as w →∞ .
The implication of Proposition 2 is somewhat surprising. It says that as poorer nations
experience development, citizens in those countries will conduct an increasing fraction of
their sexual activity in safe forms; but after a critical level of development is reached, the
practice of unsafe sex may start to go up again.19
The intuition is as follows. When wages/incomes are low, saving is low and public
health is low keeping the risk of contracting AIDS fairly high. As incomes rise, saving
increases as does expenditures on public health reducing the risk of contracting AIDS.
Rational agents face the following tension: as more of the sex people have is protected,
future expected utility rises but the current utility from lack of unsafe sex falls. When
agents are suﬃciently poor, the aforementioned loss in current utility is outweighed by
the gain in future utility because the risk of catching AIDS is high; when agents are rich
enough, the former eﬀect (loss in utility from lack of unsafe sex) starts to dominate because
the risk of contracting HIV is quite low.
We illustrate our result using a numerical example.
19The 2005 Durex Global Sex Survey ﬁnds that roughly 70% of respondents from rich countries such as
Norway, Sweden, Greece confess to having had unprotected sex with a partner of unknown sexual history;
that number was below 30% for China, Spain, Hong Kong, and India. Exceptions are South Africa (64%)
and Germany (30%).
20Example 1 Let R =1 .2,γ=0 .95,τ=0 .05,δ=0 .7,φ=0 .3, and λ =0 .3. Then,








Figure 5a: p against w (Example 1)









Figure 5b: θ against w (Example 1)
An important thing to note from the ﬁgure is that p rises quite sharply with w but the
fall in p beyond a certain level of development is far more gradual. In the same way, the
model predicts that development has a much stronger eﬀect on HIV infectivity (θ) in the
early stages of development when compared to the later stages.
4.2 A non-trivial savings decision
Thus far, we have worked with models that presented a trivial savings decision. Since
young agents were assumed not to care about their current consumption, they simply
saved everything. In this section, we allow for a non-trivial savings decision when young.
A brief sketch of the changes follow.






















where θ(u,h) is deﬁned in (11). The only other change is that (4) is replaced by
w(1 − τ)=cy + S. (15)
Reworking the problem yields
S (p;h)=
w(1 − τ)







21from where it is clear that the saving decision and the decision to have unsafe sex are




implying that when agents raise their saving in response to an increase in safe sex. Routine
algebra veriﬁes that (13) is now replaced by
p−γ − (1 − p)−γ +
"
φλh(1 − δ)(1− p)
λ−1






Example 2 Retain the same parametric speciﬁcation of Example 1.










Figure 6a: p against w






Figure 6b: θ against w
As example 2 illustrates, if p∗ is unique, then the qualitative nature of the response of
p∗ to w is largely unchanged by the introduction of a non-trivial saving decision.
4.3 Multiple equilibria: Including sex as a composite and adding a cost
of protected sex
Thus far, we have focussed on settings in which agents have separate and independent
tastes for each kind of sexual activity, protected and unprotected. This approach yielded
suﬃcient analytical tractability for sure. Yet, one could argue that human beings have
preferences for sexual activity as a composite with diﬀerential weights on the protected
and unprotected varieties. To that end, let us allow for the possibility that agents care
22about the composite “good”, (αpt +( 1− α)ut) where α is the weight attached to safe sex.
20
Another aspect we’ve ignored thus far is the cost of safe sex. While such a cost may be
interpreted quite literally as the cost of procuring condoms, one may broaden the scope a
bit to include elements such as the cost of staying in one partner sexual relationships and
avoiding promiscuity, embarrassment of purchasing condoms, and so on. Even when they
are freely distributed via public health clinics, provider bias or disapproval of adolescent
sexual activity, and overall lack of conﬁdentiality may hinder their continued use (especially
among adolescents) as barriers against infection. In developed countries, the cost of having
safe sex is miniscule compared to people’s incomes but that is not the case in many poor
nations. 21
When both these new elements along with young-age consumption (cy) are introduced,
the model, while analytically intractable, provides some new insights. We quickly sketch



















and the budget constraints by
w(1 − τ)=cy + S + ap
20Cross country evidence on α is, of course, hard to ﬁnd. Scattered anecdotal evidence suggests that
A f r i c a nm e nf e e las t r o n gd i s t a s t ef o rp r o t e c t e ds e xw i t hp h r a s e sl i k e“ O n ed o e sn o tt a k es h o w e r sw i t h
a raincoat on” often used to express such dislike. In a landmark survey study, Agha et. al (2002) try to
determine why sexually experienced males and females from multiple countries in sub-Saharan Africa do not
use condoms. They ﬁnd: “Males and females most frequently reported trusting their partner as the main
reason for not using a condom in last sex with a marital or a regular (non-marital) partner. This suggests
that low personal risk perception is the most important reason for not using a condom with a marital or
a regular partner. A dislike of condoms is the most frequently cited reason for not using a condom with a
casual partner.”
21Clive Simpkins writes in a letter dated March 17, 1995 in the Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg): “What’s
not immediately obvious or important to the average Caucasian, is the resulting astonishing cost of safer sex.
In a random suss-out, all condoms cost more than R2 per unit. Add a pretty essential accompaniment, to
avoid friction which might create invisible and lethal lacerations in the latex, namely Johnson & Johnson’s
KY lubricating jelly at about R20 — yes, you read it right — for the large tube. Let’s assume parsimonious
use of the KY, and you’ll get a dozen uses out of it. That’s R2,50 per stint, bringing the total cost of the
indulgence to R4,50. Given the statistics, which indicate a three times per night frequency as not unusual
in certain communities — particularly the economically disadvantaged and condom-averse ones — and you’re
u pt oR 7 , 5 0p e rn i g h tt op r a c t i s es a f e rs e x . ”[ 1U S$≈ R 10 in 2003].
23where a i st h ec o s to fau n i to fs a f es e x ,a n dα is a fractional parameter. The remaining
aspects of the model are the same as that discussed in Section 4.2 above. It follows that
αp +( 1− α)u =( 2 α − 1)p +( 1− α)
and so, to generate increasing utility from the composite sexual activity good, we restrict
α>1/2. The agent’s problem reduces to
max
S,p
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λ







It can be checked that the ﬁrst order conditions (for an interior solution) are given by
a(w(1 − τ) − S − ap)
−γ =( ( 2 α − 1)p +( 1− α))
−γ+
(1 − δ)λh(1 − p)
λ−1
³







and saving is given by
S =
(1 − τ)w − ap
1+R
1− 1




One can incorporate (19) into (18) to get a single equation in p.
Example 3 Let α =0 .7898104,R=1 .281895,γ=0 .6393279; a =5 .831592,τ=
0.2756531,δ=0 .1867340, and λ =0 .6681025. When w =1 7 .34, for example, there are
two ﬁxed points to (18), p∗
h =0 .98 and p∗
l =0 .10.





Steady state p as a function of w [low- p equilibrium]








Steady state p as a function of w [high- p equilibrium]
In this case, there are two equilibria possible, one where most sexual activity is safe,
and another where it is not. Thus countries with similar levels of development may ﬁnd
25themselves at either one of these two equilibria; such countries may then exhibit very dif-
ferent levels of HIV infectivity. It is also interesting to note from Example 3 that countries
at the high-p equilibrium may see more unsafe sexual activity with further development
and those at the low-p equilibrium the reverse.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The received wisdom seems to be that limited risk perception about the real risks of getting
infected with the HIV virus is all that matters when it comes to explaining why Africans
continue to engage heavily in unsafe sex. In this paper, we show that even when agents are
fully aware of the risk involved in unsafe sexual activity, and fully internalize the eﬀects of
their own sexual behavior on their chance of catching HIV, they may rationally choose to
engage in such risky behavior. Our results indicate that safe sexual practice is essentially
a “normal good” and that development with a promise of a better future may be key to
reducing HIV infectivity. We also ﬁnd that once public health improves and quality of life
under AIDS rises, unsafe sex may become popular again.
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